LESS IS MORE: TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS IN CONTEXT
BRUCE

A. GREEN*

We who teach legal ethics employ many of the teacher's arts
to win our students' appreciation for the course.' We do not always succeed. As Deborah Rhode has observed, "[t]here are inherent problems and infinite ways to fail in teaching this subject."2 Yet, we continue to seek a method for teaching the course
effectively. If nothing else, our efforts have led to the development of a substantial body of literature on teaching legal ethics
to which this Article will contribute. Its focus is on what, rather
than how, to teach.
This Article asks: What should be the content of the "basic"
course in professional responsibility? Many would agree that a
law school should offer such a course, although not every law
school in fact does so, because law students must receive a basic
grounding in the subject. Accordingly, in addition to considering
how we should teach the course in "professional responsibility"
or "legal ethics"--whether by simulations, videotapes, problems,
or cases-it makes sense to consider what we should teach.
Several law schools, supported by generous grants from the
W.M. Keck Foundation, have developed interesting and innovative approaches to the teaching of professional responsibility,
which are designed to supplement or complement the basic
course. These approaches were shared in 1995 at a conference
hosted by Duke Law School and then detailed in a special issue

* Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Louis Stein
Center for Law and Ethics; A.B., Princeton University, 1978; J.D., Columbia University, 1981. I am grateful to Mary Daly, Russell Pearce, Deborah Schenk, and Rachel
Vorspan for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A
New Curriculum for a New Century, LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS., Summer/Autumn
1995, at 193, 196 (discussing innovative approaches to teaching legal ethics).
2. Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics: Professional Responsibility and
Educational Reform, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 139, 140.
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of Law and Contemporary Problems.3 These approaches include
Columbia's intensive one-week simulation course,4 North
Carolina's oral history project,5 Houston's eclectic course entitled "Personal and Professional Responsibility," which is based
on a family systems theory and quality management principles,'
as well as the "infusion" or "pervasive" approach championed by
Deborah Rhode7 and undertaken at the University of California
at Los Angeles (UCLA)8 and Stanford.9 None of these innovations are intended as a substitute for a course of study designed
to afford a basic understanding of core concepts of professional
responsibility."0
As anyone in the field of professional responsibility knows, the
focus of energy and attention on these supplementary courses
did not signal satisfaction with how basic instruction on this
subject is provided. On the contrary, teaching professional responsibility traditionally has presented an intractable problem.
The subtext, if not the text, of virtually all the writings on professional responsibility pedagogy argues that it is difficult to
teach the basic material in a manner that is cost-effective and
that achieves a reasonable level of student satisfaction." With

3. See Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 1.
4. See Carol Bensinger Liebman, The Profession of Law: Columbia Law School's
Use of Experiential Learning Techniques to Teach Professional Responsibility, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 73, 75-81.
5. See Walter H. Bennett, Jr., The University of North Carolina Intergenerational
Legal Ethics Project: Expanding the Contexts for Teaching Professional Ethics and
Values, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 173, 180-85.
6. See John Mixon & Robert P. Schuwerk, The Personal Dimension of Professional Responsibility, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 87, 92-112.,
7. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHIcs BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992) (arguing for an integrated approach to teaching legal ethics).
8. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Richard H. Sander, The 'Infusion" Method at
UCLA. Teaching Ethics Pervasively, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995,
at 129, 131-36.
9. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 140-48.
10. See Liebman, supra note 4, at 85-86; Menkel-Meadow & Sander, supra note 8,
at 135-36; Mixon & Schuwerk, supra note 6, at 113; Rhode, supra note 2, at 150.
11. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 4, at 86 ("Have other schools developed materials that provide both depth and breadth of coverage while attracting better student
attention than traditional casebooks?"); William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal
Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65 (1991) ("At most law schools, students find the
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all due respect to the fine efforts of casebook authors 2 and the
exceptional teaching abilities of the lucky few, most of us find
that the "survey" course just does not work. 13 Especially for
those law schools that provide only a basic course in professional
responsibility with no "extras," and even for those few that do
more, attention must be paid to the challenge of teaching the
basic course.
This Article addresses the principal alternative, rather than
supplement, to the "survey" course: a "contextual" course in professional responsibility. By this term, I mean a basic course that
familiarizes students with "the skills, concepts and processes
necessary to recognize and resolve ethical dilemmas"' 4 that
arise in a limited number of contexts, rather than across the full
spectrum of legal matters, practice settings, and client types.
Concededly, contextual courses do not give a complete picture.
But no single course in professional responsibility can do so. Our
experience at Fordham is that "less is more." 5 A contextual
course is more effective because it provides a better picture than
the survey course and tends to be better received.

course in legal ethics or professional responsibility boring and insubstantial, and faculty dread having to teach it."); supra note 2 and accompanying text.
12. See Edmund B. Spa'eth, Jr. et al., Teaching Legal Ethics: Exploring the Continuum, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 153, 155 n.4 (acknowledging important contributions of commercially produced casebooks and other

writings in the field).
13. See generally id. at 156-63 (describing weaknesses of survey courses in ethics

teaching).
14. TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM

203 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
15. ROBERT BROWNING, Andrea del Sarto, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF ROBERT
BROWNING 345 (Cambridge ed., 1974). Taking the form of a dramatic monologue,

Browning's poem tells the story of a technically skilled, yet ultimately failed, Renaissance painter. See id. at 345-48. Browning's del Sarto misdirects his passions toward
an artful woman who, though bound to him in matrimony, turns her attention elsewhere. See id. Toward this end, del Sarto permits his wife to deliver to her "cousin"
the proceeds of his art. See id. at 348. The painter is resigned to his inability to
win her affection, as he is to the betrayal of his own artistic promise. See id. Any
comparison between Browning's artist and legal ethics professors may be imperfect;
even so, "less is more," the credo borrowed from Browning's poem, seems apt.
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I. GOALS
At the conclusion of the 1995 conference at Duke University,
Timothy Terrell reminded the participants that relatively little
attention had been given to the question of "goals." 16 The 1997

William & Mary Conference, for which this Article was prepared, intended, in part, to redress that problem. The question
itself is ambiguous, however. When we ask about goals, we
might be asking one of two very different questions. First, what
are the ultimate goals of the law school's curriculum, or of the
law school experience overall, from the perspective of ethics and
professionalism? Second, what are the goals of any particular
professional responsibility course? These questions may have
different answers-unless, of course, the professional responsibility course is the only place in the law school in which issues
of ethics and professionalism are addressed.
A. Goals of the Law School Curriculum
If one were to ask the American Bar Association (ABA), "what
do we want our law schools to produce from the point of view of
our students and professional ethics?" I assume that the answer
would be "ethical lawyers," or something along those lines. After
all, the ABA adopted its requirement that ABA-accredited law
schools provide "instruction in the duties and responsibilities of
the legal profession " " in response to the ethical, not to mention
legal, lapses of lawyers involved in the Watergate scandal. At
minimum, one would thus expect that law schools would turn
out lawyers who know their duties and responsibilities and
would abide by them. 8 That requires, among other things, familiarity with lawyers' professional obligations, the ability to
recognize problems of professional responsibility when they arise
in practice, the ability to determine how to act when the answer

16. See Timothy P. Terrell, Ethics with an Attitude: Comments on New Directions
for Keck Philanthropy,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 355, 355.
17. AMERICAN

BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS

FOR THE APPROVAL

OF LAW

SCHOOLS

§

302(a)(iii) (1973).
18. Cf Rhode, supra note 7, at 42 ("The rationale for addressing professional responsibility issues in some form is to increase students' awareness, analytic skills,
and ultimately, if indirectly, to influence their future conduct.").
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is unclear, 19 recognition of the pressures to act inappropriately,
and the will to resist those pressures. 0
Of course, there is more. The ABA would scarcely be satisfied
with minimally ethical lawyers. The ABA exhorts lawyers to
"aspire" to high standards of professional conduct. This concept
was captured in the language of the Code of Professional Responsibility,2 and the recent calls for "professionalism"' reflect the desire for high standards of professional conduct. Law
schools should produce lawyers who not only will fulfill their
professional obligations, but who also are familiar with and
share the aspirations and values of the legal profession. These
future professionals will therefore take the right path on many
occasions when professional norms offer a choice. At least law
schools should "aspire" to produce such lawyers. We must do
more than save future lawyers from damnation in the guise of
professional discipline or malpractice actions-we have to try to
send them to heaven!
What must law schools do to enable our graduates to enter
and take their place in heaven? I take my answer from the
MacCrateReport, issued in 1992 by a task force of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar comprised of
prominent lawyers, judges, law school deans, and professors."
19. The question of how to act in areas of uncertainty is, of course, a subject of
debate within legal academia and the profession.
20. Lawyers encounter various pressures to deviate from applicable standards of
conduct. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 7, at 46 (acknowledging the influence of situations on ethical choices). Law school simulations can illustrate these pressures and
demonstrate their influence. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 4, at 84 (discussing
students' enhanced awareness of and ability to confront ethical issues following a
course in legal ethics). Consequently, legal ethics classes often examine the motivations to subordinate professional obligations to the interests of one's client, see id.,
as well as the personal pressures, such as financial problems or substance abuse,
that often contribute to disciplinary infractions.
21. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement
(1980) ("The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive.").
22. See, e.g., PROFESSIONALISM COIM., A ERICAN BAR ASS'N, TEACHING AND
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 2, (1996) (finding teaching and learning of professional
ethics to be a "lifelong" quest) [hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALIsM].
23. See generally MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 14, at xi-xiv (describing the composition of the task force).
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The report devotes several pages to outlining "the body of knowledge and skills with which a practitioner must be familiar in
order to assure that he or she will consistently conform to ethical conduct,"' and several more pages to describing the "Fundamental Values of the Profession."' This entire discussion,
taken together, would fairly fall under the rubric of "legal ethics." As the report suggests, legal ethics encompasses three
things: a body of knowledge, a fundamental lawyering skill, and
a set of values.26
The MacCrate Report expects lawyers to be familiar with a
body of "legal ethics" knowledge that includes the nature and
sources of ethical standards and the means by which professional standards are enforced.2" At its most basic, the MacCrate Report defines this body of knowledge to include an understanding
of the "concept of law as an ethical profession."28 As such, it imposes ethical obligations on its members and "[d]efines those obligations in terms which involve their interpretation both by individual attorneys at the level of conscience and by authorized
organs of the profession. " "
More demandingly, the requisite knowledge encompasses an
understanding of "[t]he fundamental ethical rules that shape
the profession and define what it means to be a legal professional"°--for example, the principles involving the allocation
of decision making between the lawyer and client, the duty to
provide competent representation, the duty of zealous representation, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and the duty of
confidentiality.

24. Id. at 206.
25. Id. at 207; see id. at 207-12.
26. See id. at 211-12.
27. See id. at 203, 205.
28. Id. at 203.
29. Id. Even this concept, if easy to communicate, may not be easy to appreciate.
Students have a tendency to think that insofar as professional obligations are left to
be interpreted and enforced by individual lawyers at the level of conscience, these
obligations are not taken very seriously by the law or by the legal profession, and
so need not be taken very seriously by lawyers or law students. Of course, if these
"ethical obligations" need not be taken seriously, why should a course that concerns
itself with them be taken seriously?
30. Id. at 205.
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Finally, acquiring the requisite knowledge requires lawyers
to gain familiarity with what the report, perhaps inartfully,
calls "[p]rimary sources of ethical rules""' governing a lawyer's
conduct, not only with respect to attorney-client relations, but
also with respect to other aspects of lawyering, including relations with courts, other lawyers, and third parties. The sources
of the ethical rules identified by the report include, but are not
limited to, the enforceable rules of professional conduct and the
body of opinions interpreting those rules that have been issued
by courts, bar associations, and others.3 2 As sources of "ethical
rules," the MacCrate Report also identifies "[cionstitutional,
statutory [and] common-law rules[, and] principles bearing
upon the ethical obligations of a lawyer.""3 Some would think
of this material as "legal" as distinguished from "ethical." For
example, Professor Hazard and others have counterposed the
"law and ethics of lawyering." 4 No matter what the characterization, the constitutional, statutory, and common law rules are
certainly part of the body of knowledge that the "ethical lawyer" must assimilate." Additionally, the MacCrate Report identifies as sources of "ethical rules": model rules of ethics that
have not been adopted by courts, but nevertheless shed light
on a lawyer's ethical obligations; aspects of ethical philosophy;
and a lawyer's personal morality." This material would not
constitute "rules" in the sense of enforceable obligations, but it
would certainly inform interpretations of rules and might otherwise guide a lawyer's professional conduct.

31. Id. at 203.
32. See id. at 204.
33. Id. at 203.
34. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETIcs OF LAWYERING 1 (2d
ed. 1994).
35. Some of this law has significance across broad areas of professional practice.
The attorney-client privilege and the law of malpractice are just two examples. Some
of this law bears on particular areas of practice-for example, the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel influences the work of criminal defense lawyers; partnership law directly affects the conduct of lawyers who work in law firms.
Although students address some of this law in other courses, its significance to how
lawyers practice is not invariably noted.
36. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 204.
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This body of knowledge may sound broad enough-especially
considering the ambiguous relationship among different "ethical
rules," e.g., those requiring confidentiality and those requiring
disclosure, among the different "sources" of ethical rules, e.g.,
the fiduciary duty of loyalty and conflict of interest rules, and
among the different regulatory mechanisms, e.g., malpractice
actions and professional discipline."1 As envisioned by the
MacCrateReport, however, legal ethics entails far more than the
accumulation of legal knowledge. It also includes the skill of
"[r]ecognizing and [r]esolving [e]thical [d]ilemmas," s which the
report places alongside such other fundamental lawyering skills
as problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research,
factual investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation,
and litigation.3 9 Additionally, the MacCrate Report and others
37. One possible source of student frustration with the subject of legal ethics is
that, as a body of "law," legal ethics seems not only complex, but also disharmonious
and indeterminate. In the introduction to their casebook, Professors Morgan and Rotunda give this point a more positive spin, when they observe: '[Flar from being a
unitary profession with a long and consistent tradition grounded in fundamental
philosophical ideals, the legal profession is a rich, complex, and often perverse mixture of traditions, roles and standards." THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (6th ed. 1995).

Students are not necessarily beguiled by the perversity of this mixture. They
come to their courses seeking to understand the subject matter; however, it is a lot
to expect of students to understand the interrelationship of legal ethics principles
and processes when even their professors must work hard to do so. The very complexity of both the interrelating processes for regulating lawyers and the interrelationship between professional rules and legal norms governing lawyers' conduct has
drawn many legal academics to these topics. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995) (discussing the lack of effective discipline for unethical
conduct by prosecutors) [hereinafter Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors]; Bruce A.
Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the
Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991) (highlighting the ethical codes' weaknesses as they relate to the conduct of criminal defense attorneys) [hereinafter Green,
Zealous Representation Bound]; Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the
State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389 (1992) (asserting that ethical norms are in competition
and conflict with the law); Ted Schneyer, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of
Lawyers-Forward: Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996) (delineating the issues surrounding lawyer regulation);
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992)
(evaluating the debate about whether lawyers should be subject to external regulation designed to detect and deter unethical conduct).
38. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 206; see id. at 203.
39. See id. at 138-40. The MacCrate Report appears to envision the skill of resolv-
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would say that legal ethics encompasses the fundamental values
of the profession. The MacCrateReport identifies four principal
values: provision of competent representation; striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality; striving to improve the
profession; and professional self-development.40 Others might
nominate additional candidates. 4
Can we seriously expect law schools to achieve all this-to
impart all this knowledge, fully develop this skill, instill these
values, or, to be more realistic, sufficiently expose students to
them-all in the space of three years? We make no pretense that
students graduate from law school with all the knowledge and
skill they need to carry out most other lawyering tasks. For
example, we do not expect them to be able to do anything as
basic as counseling a client about contractual provisions, negotiating a contract, or drafting a contract. As the MacCrate Report
envisions, law school is an early stage in an "educational continuum."42 Only over time, with oversight by senior lawyers in
one's law office, with the help of mentors, or through professional self-development, is one expected to acquire the requisite
skills and knowledge to practice some, but scarcely all, aspects
of law competently and independently.
Yet, I suspect that the ABA, if not the public, would be terribly displeased with the concept that we aim not to graduate ethical lawyers-for that would be casting our sights too high-but
ing ethical dilemmas as an aspect of legal analysis that calls for the lawyer to apply
the rules and principles of professional responsibility to his or her own conduct. See
id. at 206-07. Others would envision ethical decision making as also involving independent moral reflection. In this respect, the skill of resolving ethical dilemmas
would involve something more than, or different from, ordinary legal analysis.
40. See id. at 207-21.
41. Certainly, the "values" of the legal profession have changed substantially since
the nineteenth century, see, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, The Fault in Legal Ethics,
100 DIcK. L. REv. 489, 501-03 (1996) (discussing different ideals that have influenced the field of legal ethics); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992) (contrasting
George Sharswood's nineteenth-century view of ethics as for the common good with
the ABA's approach), and will continue to change. One might fairly argue that in
addition to those values that have gained currency, there are others-such as that
lawyers should not discriminate in their law practice on bases such as race, religion,
gender, and sexual orientation-that ought to be recognized by the profession, even
if their importance has not yet been reflected fully in the professional literature.
42. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 3-8.
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just to nudge our students further down the continuum toward
one day becoming ethical lawyers. Maybe not in the first year or
two, but in time, with the help of a senior lawyer in law practice, our graduates will become "ethical." This concept might relieve bar examiners of the task, which, as Deborah Rhode has
argued, might in any event be hopeless,4" of trying to distinguish between applicants with good and bad character; at least
it might justify deferring the task. This is an unappealing concept, however, primarily because we cannot accept the prospect
of licensed practitioners who are less than ethical from the start,
but also because if law schools cannot be counted on to produce
ethical lawyers, those institutions in the real world of law practice are unlikely to do any better.'
So, one might conclude, this is an appropriate professional
responsibility of law schools. Law schools should turn out ethical
lawyers through a combination of means, including pervasive
instruction in legal ethics, clinics and simulations, opportunities
to hear from real lawyers,45 noncurricular programs, and, of
course, the basic course in legal ethics. To be sure, this is ambitious. "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp, / Or
what's a heaven for?"46
B. Goals of the Basic Course in Legal Ethics
If law schools have a responsibility to produce ethical lawyers,
then what contribution should the basic course in legal ethics

43. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE
L.J. 491, 591 (1985).
44. See generally Eleanor W. Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 823, 827-33 (1996) (discussing the perception that professional standards are declining in law practice and the "continuing emphasis on law school as
the primary forum for values training").
An additional source of law student resistance to legal ethics instruction derives
from the sense of irrelevance or unreality about the course that comes from the
disjunction between legal ethics as taught in law school and legal ethics as practiced
(or not practiced) in some law practices to which students are exposed during law
school through summer employment or part-time employment during the academic
year. See id. at 824-25.
45. This would include both lawyers who are moral exemplars and lawyers who
have strayed.
46. Browning, supra note 15, at 346.
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make toward this goal? No one would seriously suggest that a
single course in legal ethics can do all that the MacCrateReport
envisions. As we know, many law schools devote only one or two
credits to the subject, and some of our finest law
schools-Professors Cramton and Koniak list several examples-appear to "require little or no instruction in legal ethics."4 7 Moreover, even a required course that devotes three or
four credits to the subject is far from adequate.48 So, how much
of these goals can the basic course achieve?
An appropriate goal of one teaching any basic course in legal
ethics-be it a "survey" or "contextual" course-is simply to accomplish as much as possible with limited resources. In other
words, move students as far as possible down the continuum
toward becoming lawyers who are conversant with the body of
legal ethics knowledge, skilled at recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas in light of this knowledge, and familiar with the
profession's values.4 9 It is liberating to recognize that one class
cannot fully accomplish the ultimate goal, which might more
fairly be ascribed to the law school curriculum overall, of fully
developing ethical lawyers. These limits allow personal choices
about which aspects of "legal ethics" knowledge to address and
how much emphasis to place on the body of knowledge as opposed to the lawyering skill or the professional values.
How far along the continuum students should be pushed is
directly related to one's personal and resource limitations. For, in
this respect, we are all teaching legal ethics "in context." 50 That
context includes some things that no one can do much about, such
as the resistance that many students bring to the course. 5 ' It
includes other things for which law school administrations and
faculties bear responsibility, such as class size and credit

47. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 147 n.14 (1996).

48. See Stephen McG. Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experiment,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 18, 31-34.
49. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 332 (enumerating the recommendations of the task force on how to enhance professional development during law

school).
50. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 47, at 162-63.
51. See supra notes 29, 37 & 44; infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
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hours. "2 It includes limits on one's own time and ability.53
To be sure, we need not approve of the context in which we
teach, at least insofar as it includes the law school's dedication
of inadequate resources to the subject. I am fortunate to teach at
one of the law schools that devotes considerable full-time faculty
resources to the teaching of legal ethics, but in many law schools
legal ethics is limited to one or two credits, if that, and taught
predominantly or exclusively by adjunct faculty members.' Indeed, in the past, full-time faculty members, particularly before
they become tenured, sometimes have been discouraged affirmatively from writing and teaching in the area.55
Yet, if we need not approve of them, then we must surely respect our limits. As my own experience has demonstrated, we
are limited in what we can accomplish even in a four-credit seminar taught by two professors. We are far more limited in what
we can accomplish in a class of eighty to 160 students with fewer credit hours.5 6 We teach more effectively if we are realistic
about what we can achieve.5 7 If we try to teach students everything, both we and they are likely to come away with nothing
but frustration. Less is more.
Additionally, the context in which we teach will also influence
decisions about how much weight to give to ethics rules versus
other legal standards versus unenforceable professional stan-

52. See, e.g., Cramton & Koniak, supra note 47, at 147 (discussing the minor aca-

demic role of legal ethics in most law schools); Daly et al., supra note 1, at 195
(discussing ways that law schools denote the second-class status of ethics classes);
John S. Dzienkowski et al., Integrating Theory and Practice into the Professional
Responsibility Curriculum at the University of Texas, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-

mer/Autumn 1995, at 213, 213 (observing that large lecture-style survey affords abstract familiarity with legal ethics but includes no examination of topics "in depth,
or with any sense of concreteness").
53. See Rhode, supra note 7, at 51-52 (discussing faculty members' reluctance to
devote time and effort to the teaching of ethics).
54. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 47, at 147.
55. Perhaps this is changing. An important accomplishment of the W.M. Keck
Foundation was to encourage some prominent law schools to pay greater respect to
the subject of ethics. If these law schools continue to take legal ethics seriously by
continuing and building on the work supported by the Keck grants, then, other law
schools may be influenced to give the subject of legal ethics the importance it deserves.
56. See Dzienkowski et al., supra note 52, at 213.
57. See Myers, supra note 44, at 858.
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dards versus ethical philosophy and personal morality. We will
also have to decide how much weight to give to any or all of this
material compared with providing experience in identifying and
attempting to resolve ethical problems, and exposing students to
professional values. To the extent that the law school does some
of this work elsewhere in the curriculum, or outside the classroom, there may be less need to do it in the basic legal ethics
class."
In most law schools today, the basic legal ethics course is expected to carry most of the burden for training students in this
area. Where that is the case, three credits is the bare minimum
that can be allotted responsibly to the basic course. In such a
course, moving students down the continuum would initially
include familiarizing students with the core issues of professional responsibility, such as the allocation of decision making between lawyer and client, and the duties of competence, confidentiality, loyalty, and zealous advocacy (and their limits). The
course would also include familiarizing students with some of
the law and ethics of lawyering, with particular emphasis on
some aspects of the body of law and ethics rules that bear on the
core issues. Finally, the course would help students to begin
developing the skill of recognizing ethical problems as they arise
in practice and the ability to resolve ethical problems in light of
the history and traditions of legal practice, expressions of professional norms, moral philosophy, and personal morality. I suspect
that these goals are fairly conservative and that most legal ethics professors would number them among their own, even if
many of our courses would differ in emphasis.5 9

58. See generally Daly et al., supra note 1, at 197-98 (discussing the possibility of
raising ethical issues in all substantive courses).
59. Those who participated in the conference at Duke University identified varying
goals in varying numbers, but a common thread seemed to be the obvious one of
teaching students how to understand and determine what is appropriate lawyer conduct. Professor Bundy encapsulated this in a single overarching goal-to impart a
"centered, comprehensive understanding of the lawyer's role." Bundy, supra note 48,
at 33. Professors Menkel-Meadow and Sander suggested two goals: (1) undertaking a
'detailed and systematic treatment of rules, codes, and other legal ethics issues" and
(2) teaching "students . . . to recognize a legal ethics issue, even if they could not
immediately find 'the right answer." Menkel-Meadow & Sander, supra note 8, at
130. Professor Gillers's course has four aims. Its two primary goals are: (1) "to im-
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CONTEXTUAL COURSES

In all law school courses, including legal ethics courses, trade
offs must be made. As noted previously, one trade off is among
goals: Do we spend more time in developing familiarity with core
concepts and applicable rules, in developing relevant skills, or in
exposing students to professional values? Another trade off is
between breadth and depth of coverage: Do we look at multiple
issues superficially or at a few more deeply?"0 Although teaching legal ethics contextually does not reflect a judgment about
how to strike the balance among competing goals, it does reflect
a judgment about coverage. A contextual course in legal ethics,
press students with the special nature of their relationship to clients . . . [and to
enable students] to understand the rules that will daily govern their professional
lives"; and (2) "to recognize professional responsibility issues that may arise in their
working lives." Stephen Gillers, Getting Personal, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 61, 62-63. Its two secondary aims are: (3) to help "students to
understand the organization, governance, and something of the history of the American legal profession;" and (4) "to address issues of race and gender in law practice."
Id. at 63-64. Professor Liebman explained that Columbia's course has five goals:
[1] to introduce students to the rules that govern professional conduct; [21
to help them develop an analytic framework for making ethical decisions
in those broad areas where the rules do not give clear answers; [3] to
provoke them to think about what it means to be an ethical practitioner;
[4] to help them explore the relationship between their personal morality
and professional ethics; [5] and to give them the opportunity to practice
ethical decisionmaking.
Liebman, supra note 4, at 73.
This thread also appears to run through the commercially-produced legal ethics
casebooks. A possible exception is DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1995), whose authors indicate that their principal goal is to "explore]
how lawyers forge their professional identities." Id. at 1. Like other texts, however,
this one "takes the law of lawyering as its point of departure," id., and relies on
"short, distilled versions of actual problems." Id. at 2.
There are differences in emphasis. Whereas some would place greater importance on the body of legal ethics knowledge, others would place greater importance
on the "skill" of reflective judgment. See, e.g., Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia
Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of Teaching ProfessionalResponsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 102 (1991) (arguing that professional responsibility instruction "should aim to sensitize students to the ethical dimensions of the lawyer's
professional role, provide insight into the nature of the legal profession, and cultivate a willingness to engage in reflective judgment").
60. This assumes sufficient time for one or the other. Some approaches, however,
whatever their other virtues, may not allow adequate time to examine the subject
broadly or deeply. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 4, at 85 (discussing Columbia Law
School's intensive, week-long ethics course).
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as distinguished from a survey course, resolves this trade off by
looking at problems of legal ethics that arise in a limited number of contexts, rather than across the full spectrum of legal
practice. 6
A number of law schools, Fordham among them, offer contextual courses either as a substitute for a survey course or as a
supplement. The first contextual offerings appear to have been
in the area of tax practice. The first and only commercially produced casebook designed for a contextual ethics course, Ethical
Problems in Federal Tax Practice,was first published in 198162
and is now in its third edition." The casebook covers essentially the same subjects as the "survey" casebooks, albeit in the context of tax cases, and thus can be used in a basic legal ethics
course as well as an advanced course.
More recently, several of the Keck Foundation grant recipients
developed course material for contextual courses. For example,
Thomas Metzloff, organizer of the conference at Duke University,
described the development of such courses to supplement the
basic required course that Duke offers in an intensive one-week
format during the first year." His article describes in detail his
own course entitled "Ethical Issues in Civil Litigation"6 5 and
notes that Duke has offered more than ten contextual courses,
which have "included examinations of ethical issues faced by
lawyers principally involved in particular fields such as administrative law, corporate law, criminal law, and family law."66 Similarly, Heidi Li Feldman described Michigan's development of
upper-level seminars in legal ethics such as "Selected Problems in
Litigation Ethics," which "concentrated on ethical issues confronting the insurance defense lawyer."6 7 John Dzienkowski de-

61. See Daly et al., supra note 1, at 193-94.
62. BERNARD WoLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX
PRACTICE (1st ed. 1981).
63. BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (3d
ed. 1995).
64. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Seeing the Trees Within the Forest: Contextualized
Ethics Courses as a Strategy for Teaching Legal Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer/Autumn 1995, at 227, 228.
65. Id. at 228-38.
66. Id. at 238.
67. Heidi Li Feldman, Enriching the Legal Ethics Curriculum: From Requirement
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scribed Texas's development of the "Keck Seminar on the Large
Law Firm Practice."" Recently, an ABA committee recommended developing additional courses of this nature."
Where legal ethics is taught through simulation, the course is
particularly likely to be contextual. For example, Robert Burns
described Northwestern's integrated program in trial advocacy,
evidence, and ethics taken by approximately forty percent of the
student body.7" The course examines ethical problems principally in the context of the work of litigators, work that is not limited to courtroom advocacy, but also entails interviewing, counseling, negotiating, and marketing legal services.7
At Fordham, where students are required to take a three- or
four-credit basic course in legal ethics, students are offered a
choice between one of the contextual courses and the survey
course. In an article prepared in connection with the Duke conference, my colleagues and I described our initial contextual
offerings, which included legal ethics courses focusing on corporate and international practice, public interest law, and criminal
advocacy.72 Supported by a generous grant from the W.M. Keck
Foundation, Fordham since has added three other basic legal
ethics courses to its curriculum; they are entitled: Professional
Responsibility: Regulatory, Tax and International Practice,7"
Professional Responsibility: Corporate Counsel,74 and Lawyerto Desire, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 51, 57.
68. See Dzienkowski et al., supra note 52, at 224-26.
69. See TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 22, at 21 (suggesting "[t]he development of additional elective courses and seminars that focus on ethical and professionalism issues in the context of a particular substantive area of
practice (e.g., The Professional Responsibility of the Litigator)").
70. See Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics Class Through Simulation: The
Northwestern Program in Advocacy and Professionalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer/Autumn 1995, at 37, 43-44.
71. See id.
72. See Daly et al., supra note 1, at 200. The article also describes an advanced
seminar in ethics and public interest law. See id.
73. This class examines the increasingly complex web of professional standards,

statutes, regulations, and common law rights that govern a lawyer's conduct when
representing clients in the modern administrative state and in the global business
arena. Particular attention is paid to ethical issues in the context of federal securities and tax law, regulatory malpractice, cross-border practice, and representation of
business entities such as corporations, general and limited partnerships, and joint
ventures.
74. This course explores the ethical implications of the work of in-house corporate
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ing for Individuals (originally entitled Ethics in Small Firm and
Solo Practice).7'
Teaching legal ethics in context does not presuppose any particular teaching methodology. At Fordham, for example, contextual courses are taught in a variety of ways. Several are offered as
classes or seminars, and one is taught principally through simulations. They differ in the nature of the readings; the extent to
which they rely on computer instruction, videotaped materials, or
outside speakers; and the nature and source of the problems.
Indeed, the professors who teach the contextual courses take
different approaches, depending on which course is taught. The
two basic courses I have offered, Ethics in Criminal Advocacy and
Lawyering for Individuals, hardly exhaust the possibilities, but
the differences between these courses serve to illustrate that
contextual courses place few limits on teaching methodologies.
Ethics in Criminal Advocacy is a three-credit seminar in
which students read approximately seventy pages of cases and
articles each week, participate in class discussions, and prepare
a research paper of at least twenty-five pages. Virtually all the
readings relate to the professional conduct of criminal prosecutors or criminal defense lawyers.7" Following an introduction on
attorneys' roles, rules, and regulations, the material takes up, in
order:
(1) confidentiality (including the scope of the attorney-client
privilege, the ethical duty and its limits, prosecutorial intrusions
into attorney-client relations, and attorney-client confidentiality
in the corporate context);
(2) competence of counsel;(3) counseling and decision making;
(4) client and witness peijury;

counsel in such tasks as negotiating transactions and supervising litigation. This role
has changed radically over the last 20 years as the power and authority traditionally wielded by outside counsel has diminished.
75. See infra pp. 375-77 (describing the course). Additionally, with the support of
the Keck grant, Fordham added a two-credit advanced legal ethics seminar to its
curriculum, which does not satisfy the law school's professional responsibility requirement, entitled The Judicial Role and Responsibilities.
76. The exception is In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (sanctioning a lawyer for failing to report misconduct of client's previous lawyer).
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(5) the duty of candor (including in communications with an adversary, the court, and third parties);
(6) further limits on zealous advocacy (including limits on relations with witnesses, ex parte communications, discovery, trial
tactics, and summations);
(7) limits on lawyer speech (including pretrial and trial publicity,
and public criticisms of judges and prosecutors);
(8) prosecutorial discretion (including investigating, charging,
plea bargaining, and sentencing decisions);
(9) conflicts of interest;
(10) marketing the defense lawyer's services (including advertising, solicitation, and attorney's fees); and
(11) regulation of the prosecutor.
As this list reflects, the materials cover the core issues of legal
ethics but exclude peripheral issues covered in the "survey"
casebooks, such as the unauthorized practice of law, minimum
fee schedules, and judicial ethics. Further, while addressing
some aspects of the "law of lawyering"-e.g., the attorney-client
privilege, malpractice, cash-reporting requirements, forfeiture
law, and obstruction of justice-the course leaves out others-e.g., securities, regulatory, and tax law.
In this seminar, class discussions, including occasional role
playing, are organized around problems, or "stories,"77 involving
the professional conduct of prosecutors and criminal defense
lawyers. Most problems are contained in or suggested by the
readings,78 prompting students both to analyze the problems
and to think critically about how the problems are addressed by
the legal professional. Because the context is circumscribed, students have considerable opportunity to explore how different
legal ethics issues interrelate.7 "
77. See, e.g., Cramtn & Koniak, supra note 47, at 177-81.
78. These include relevant provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice, as well as judicial decisions, ethics opinions, and
excerpts from secondary literature.
79. For example, the readings on "confidentiality" include Cesena v. Du Page
County, 558 N.E.2d 1378 (Ill. App. 1990), rev'd, 582 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 1991), a decision involving whether withholding the identity of a lawyer's client, a hit-and-run
driver, is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Students are asked to presume
they are lawyers, retained by the hit-and-run driver who is subject to the state's
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In contrast, during the fall of 1996 Fordham offered for the
first time a four-credit course on lawyering for individuals. The
course's teaching method combined: simulations that addressed
ethical problems in the context of counseling, interviewing, and
negotiating exercises; drafting exercises; and independent research assignments. Margaret Flint, an adjunct professor, and I
taught the course. Professor Flint previously taught lawyering
skills courses for several years at two other New York City law
schools. Each of the sixteen students in the course undertook
one of four substantial research assignments, carried out various
shorter drafting assignments, either independently or in groups
of four, and participated in interviewing, counseling, and negotiating exercises both in and out of the classroom.
Unlike the majority of Fordham's contextual courses, which
focus on lawyers in the "hemisphere" serving corporations and
other large organizations,"0 Lawyering for Individuals focused
on lawyers in the second "hemisphere"- those in solo practice or
small firm settings who serve individuals and small

mandatory reporting requirement. The students then consider various questions that
likely would arise in counseling the client. For example, how should the lawyer
counsel the client concerning whether to comply with the statutory obligation to report the accident? On one hand, the possibility exists that the driver will be prosecuted for driving recklessly if he reports himself; on the other hand, the possibility
exists that he will never be caught if he does not comply with the reporting requirement. If the client decides to ignore the reporting requirement, then must the lawyer report the client? May the lawyer do so? May or must the lawyer withdraw
from the representation? If the representation continues, then how should the lawyer
counsel the client concerning the possibility of approaching the prosecutor on behalf
of an anonymous client and attempting to negotiate a plea agreement? To what extent should these decisions be influenced by concerns about the lawyer's own criminal liability, and how should the lawyer otherwise address such concerns? How
should the lawyer factor in the possibility that the prosecutor will subpoena and
question the lawyer about the client's identity? If the prosecutor did so, then would
the identity of the client be privileged? Assuming that it might not be, what factors
should influence the prosecutor's decision whether to issue a subpoena to the defense
lawyer? If the defense lawyer attempts to negotiate a plea agreement, then what
representations may the lawyer properly make concerning the causes of the accident?
Should the prosecutor enter into such a deal? What considerations are appropriate
or inappropriate to consider in making this decision?
80. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 127-75 (rev. ed. 1994) (discussing two "hemispheres"
of law practice, as reflected in data gathered by surveying more than 800 Chicago
lawyers in 1974-75).
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businesses."' The four research projects dealt with problems of
professional conduct in the context of: (1) representing a small
business in a transaction that may lead to litigation; (2) defending a company and its employee in a personal injury case; (3)
representing spouses in estate planning; and (4) representing a
plaintiff in a personal injury action. Core issues raised by these
problems included: (1) how and when an attorney-client relationship begins and ends; (2) defining the scope of the representation; (3) the duty of competence and its enforcement via malpractice actions; (4) confidentiality; (5) client counseling and the
division of decision making authority; (6) conflicts of interest; (7)
candor to the courts, opposing counsel, and unrepresented parties; (8) client pejury; and (9) the attorney's fee arrangement.
Other issues were explored through shorter writing assignments
or role playing. For example, students familiarized themselves
with the standards governing advertising and solicitation by
working in groups of four to develop marketing plans for a
trusts and estates law firm.
The institutional resources committed to the Lawyering for
Individuals course permitted a more complete development of
the skill of resolving ethical problems, building upon aspects of
the requisite body of knowledge. Taking a page from the
MacCrate Report, the course envisioned "legal ethics" as a skill
that is both comparable to and dependent on the lawyering
skills of problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, research,
investigation, communication, counseling, and negotiation.82
For example, situations involving representation of
coclients-e.g., a husband and wife in estate planning or an
employer and employee in a personal injury case-may require
the lawyer to: recognize the possibility of a conflict of interest;
interview both clients to ascertain the facts relevant to the possible conflict of interest; research authorities bearing on whether
representation may be undertaken or continued in light of the
particular information adduced by the lawyer; analyze the facts
81. See id.
82. The required texts for the course were: DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991); DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1989); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS (1986); and a collection of standards of professional responsibility.

1998]

TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS IN CONTEXT

377

to determine whether, under the applicable ethics rules and
authorities, representation is permissible; explain the problem to
the clients; and where appropriate, counsel the clients regarding
whether to seek different counsel or to consent to representation
notwithstanding the lawyer's conflict of interest. Because the
class was small, we were able to place all students in various
simulations designed to promote the development of each of
these skills. Even with two professors, however, the students
were not provided nearly as much feedback as they would have
liked and, ideally, should have received.
In addition to reflecting different teaching methodologies, the
courses entitled Ethics in Criminal Advocacy and Lawyering for
Individuals reflected different emphases on the components of
ethical lawyering identified in the MacCrateReport. The differences between contextual courses offered at Fordham and those
offered elsewhere probably are even more pronounced. It may be
that the "survey" approach affords a similar degree of freedom;
certainly, there are significant differences in emphasis among
the various casebooks. As discussed below, teaching legal ethics
contextually offers other benefits that may make such an approach preferable.
III. THE BENEFITS OF TEACHING IN CONTEXT

If the basic legal ethics course is conceptualized as an early
step toward training law students to recognize and resolve legal
ethics problems, how should the course be taught? Several pedagogic implications seem obvious and fairly standard. First, the
course should engage students in examining situations that
raise ethical questions, especially situations involving such core
issues as decision making, confidentiality, loyalty, etc. The situations may be presented in various ways, incorporating judicial
opinions, bar association opinions, newspaper articles, constructed problems, dramatized monologues and dialogues, or a combination of these.' Second, students should be exposed to the
body of knowledge relevant to resolving these problems, for ex-

83. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 2, at 140 (identifying various approaches to teaching legal ethics employed by Professor Rhode over the past 16 years).
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ample ethics rules, law of lawyering, etc.' Third, students
should be engaged in the exercise of identifying and resolving
these problems in light of the applicable sources of "ethical
rules."85 Although students may be "engaged" in different ways,
including lectures, in-class discussion, and student role playing,
clearly, as is true of any lawyering skill, the skill of identifying
and resolving ethical problems is best learned through doing and
with the benefit of feedback.86 Lectures may prove to be less
expensive but, at the same time, they may prove to be less effective at teaching legal ethics.87
This leaves other questions: How many situations should be
examined? And, which ones? The idea of confining legal ethics
classes to a limited number of contexts has various attractions,
wholly apart from pedagogic concerns. One is that a curriculum
comprised of contextual courses may expand the pool of faculty
willing to teach legal ethics, by allowing professors to focus on
their areas of greatest interest, experience, and expertise.' Another is that these courses may promote scholarship by allowing
those faculty members who write about legal ethics to explore
more deeply those issues about which they would like to
write.89
On the question of pedagogy, however, conventional wisdom
suggests that the basic legal ethics course should survey the full
range of contexts in which lawyers work." That is certainly the
assumption underlying the commercially produced texts. The
thought behind the contextual courses, in contrast, is that it is
more effective to limit the contexts in which ethical questions
are examined. In seeking to achieve the goals of a basic legal
ethics course, as in defining those goals, less is more.
As discussed below, contextual courses have three principal
advantages over survey courses. First, they give a more realistic
picture of how ethical issues arise and are addressed in law prac-

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See,
See,
See
See
See
See
See

e.g., Gillers, supra note 59, at 63.
e.g., Spaeth et al., supra note 12, at 159-60.
Gillers, supra note 59, at 68-70.
Rhode, supra note 2, at 141.
Bundy, supra note 48, at 29.
Feldman, supra note 67, at 57.
Daly et al., supra note 1, at 198.
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tice.s ' Second, they allow more time to deal with the material at
the heart of the course by reducing the time that must be allocated toward filling in "context."92 Third, they reduce some of the
students' resistance toward the legal ethics requirement.9
A. The Importance of Context to UnderstandingLegal Ethics
A principal advantage of contextual courses is that they give
newcomers to the legal ethics field a better picture of law practice because "very few lawyers in the private sector can leg[iltmately [ ] claim the title of 'generalist."' 4 More importantly,
contextual courses afford a truer picture of how lawyers experience legal ethics problems.95
To see why this is so, consider each of the following ten lawyers:
(1) a partner in a large, Wall Street law firm who concentrates
in the area of commercial litigation;
(2) an in-house counsel for a bank who is principally responsible
for issues of compliance with federal law;
(3) a solo practitioner who represents individuals and small
businesses in commercial matters, trusts and estates planning,
and other transactional and planning contexts;
(4) a full-time criminal prosecutor who practices in a rural county;
(5) a criminal defense lawyer who practices in an urban public
defender's office;
(6) a legal services lawyer who serves indigent clients seeking

91. See infra Part III.A.
92. See infra Part III.B.
93. See infra Part Ill.C.
94. Daly et al., supra note 1, at 211; see MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 11
("[I]n virtually every practice setting the individual lawyer is compelled to concentrate in one or several areas of law, while clinging to the traditional image of being
a 'generalist.'").
This was true even 70 years ago. See In re Bd. of Law Exam'r Examination of
1926, 210 N.W. 710, 711 (Wis. 1926) ("[I1n harmony with the vastly increasing complexity of our industrial and commercial interests .... specialization in the various
fields of the [legall profession has become necessary and common.").
95. As Professor Metzloff put it, "[ilnherent in this pedagogical approach is an
assumption that while there are overlapping considerations across various practice
areas, the ethical issues faced by lawyers in these different contexts vary to a considerable extent." Metzloff, supra note 64, at 228.
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public benefits;
(7) an assistant city corporation counsel who defends the city in
tort and contract litigation;
(8) a small firm practitioner who, concentrating in the area of
family law, frequently represents children by court appointment
in abuse and neglect cases;
(9) a personal injury lawyer who represents plaintiffs; and
(10) an insurance company staff counsel who defends insured
individuals and businesses in personal injury actions.
All ten lawyers have some things in common. They all practice law, a profession" with a distinctive history and set of traditions. They all are licensed practitioners and, consequently,
are subject to rules of professional conduct that, facially, do not
differentiate between practitioners or areas of practice for different treatment but appear to apply generally to all lawyers.97
Further, they all are subject to discipline by a disciplinary agency under judicial supervision.98
But, it is doubtful that one could design effectively a single
course in legal ethics as part of a continuing legal education
program that would be relevant to every one of these lawyers.
Further, if one were to design ten different professional responsibility courses, specifically directed to each of these ten lawyers,
the courses would look extraordinarily different. 9 Each lawyer
would give a significantly different answer to such questions as:
What are the recurring problems of professional conduct that
you face? How do the applicable rules of professional conduct
apply to those problems? What other bodies of law apply to
those problems? By what mechanisms are the ethical rules and
law enforced?

96. For an argument that the practice of law has been transformed from a "profession" to a "business," see Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift:
Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of
the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995).

97. Most states have adopted ethics rules based on the models promulgated by the
ABA in 1969 and 1983. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).

98. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
99. See Daly et al., supra note 1, at 201.
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Although the "survey" course remains the dominant approach
to teaching legal ethics in law schools, increasing recognition is
being given to the profound importance of context. This recognition is reflected not only in legal ethics scholarship,0 0 but also
in literature concerning legal ethics instruction,' including
most recently, the collection developed from the conference at
Duke University.0 2 The particular area of law that a lawyer
practices is probably the most relevant context in which legal
ethics problems must be resolved.' 3 Another important consid-

100. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern
Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 460, 517-18 (1996) (asserting that "specific rules are superior to general rules
in capturing appropriate contextual distinctions"); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for
Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 149 (1993) (arguing that the ABA should consider separate ethics codes for
certain specialty practices); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993) (pointing out the importance of context-based arguments in the Kaye, Scholer case).
In coitrast, the ABA traditionally has promoted the idea that ethical norms are
universal. See Green, supra, at 490 n.146. Within the organized bar, however, the're
is growing appreciation for the importance of context in determining ethical obligations, to the point that an ABA committee recently recommended "[alssigning only
faculty with extensive practice experience . . . to teach the basic and advanced ethics and professionalism courses" because "[i]t is very difficult for a law professor who
has little or no practice experience to understand or to convey to students the context in which these issues arise and must be resolved." TEACHING AND LEARNING
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 22, at 18.

101. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 44, at 838-48 (recommending that students be
taught about the legal profession's diversity stemming from "the nature of the professional work itself, the diversity of the people engaged in practice, and the
contextualized nature of ethical decisionmaking").
102. For example, Professor Burns observed the benefit of "[a] contextual and concrete appreciation of what the law of the profession either requires or allows."
Burns, supra note 70, at 39 (emphasis omitted). Professors.Mixon and Schuwerk noted "the engaged, contextual resort to personal and professional values and relationships required for true professional behavior." Mixon & Schuwerk, supra note 6, at
89. Professors Koniak and Hazard, coauthors of a leading casebook that takes the
"survey" approach, acknowledged: "The subject of 'practical ethics' is above all contextual. By contextual, we mean that practical ethics addresses specific persons situated
in specific settings having to make decisions in real time (of which there is always a
shortage) with imperfect information, with real and often irreversible consequences."
Susan P. Koniak & Geoffirey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 117, 126.
103. Again, quoting Professors Koniak and Hazard:
[Tihe ethical problems confronting lawyers cannot be extricated from the
law. First, the problems arise in the practice of some specific area of law
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eration is the social context of the lawyer's practice.' °4 This includes the practice setting, whether a solo law practice, law
firm, corporation, legal services office, or government law office;
the geographical setting, whether urban or rural;0 5 the
lawyer's relationship to the client, whether the lawyer is the
client's employee, is appointed by the court or retained, or serves
for a fee or pro bono. °5 A third consideration is the nature of
the client. Independent of the legal and social context, representing an entity is different from representing an individual; representing the government is different from representing other
entities; and representing a child, or an older person with a
disability, is different from representing other individuals."7
Context matters in at least four ways. First, particular rules
of professional conduct and issues of professional conduct may or

(for example, securities law or divorce litigation). The specific "background" law, the substantive area in which the problem is embedded,
itself often creates the dilemma, and it may also provide a way out of it.
Second, the background law or the law governing lawyers (agency law,
criminal law, civil procedure, evidence law, and the ethics rules) may
prescribe paths upon which lawyers are supposed to travel when facing
such dilemmas and may proscribe other paths.
Koniak & Hazard, supra note 102, at 122. Stephen Bundy has noted that:
There is lots of "law of lawyering" that is worth learning. Moreover, careful attention to the considerations which shape that law can go far to
illuminate how a lawyer ought to act when the legal rules governing her
conduct cease to provide clear guidance or, perhaps more radically, when
those rules seem clearly unjust.
Bundy, supra note 48, at 31.
104. See Myers, supra note 44, at 831-33; Rhode, supra note 43, at 558-59.
105. See Myers, supra note 44, at 831-33 (citing authorities supporting the proposition that the practice setting has an effect on the ethical decisions of an attorney).
106. Recognizing the importance of this consideration, Boalt Hall's "Lawyers and
Clients" course used theoretical and empirical works, simulations, and role-playing in
order "to generate deeper engagement with professional ethics issues and, in particular, a better understanding of how professional norms and behavior are influenced
by the social context of legal practice." Bundy, supra note 48, at 21. According to
Professor Bundy, the "course's focus [was] on how the setting of practice shapes
lawyer obligations and conduct." Id. at 23.
107. See generally Bruce A. Green & Nancy Coleman, Ethical Issues in Representing
Older Clients-Foreword, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 961 (1994) (discussing the need for
legal ethics to respond to the unique needs of the elderly); Bruce A. Green &
Bernardine Dohrn, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Children-Foreword Children and the Ethical Practice of Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996) (noting the
ethical considerations involved when legally representing children).

19981

TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS IN CONTEXT

383

may not be very significant. To give one example, rules governing attorney's fees and marketing deeply affect the conduct of
solo practitioners and lawyers in law firms, but do not affect the
conduct of in-house lawyers, government lawyers, or legal services lawyers; indeed, the problem for legal services lawyers is not
how to get more business, but how to choose from among an
overflow of possible clients. To give another example, client
capacity issues do not much matter to corporate or government
lawyers, but matter intensely for lawyers representing children
and those representing older clients." 8
Second, depending on the context, particular aspects of the
other "law of lawyering" may or may not be very significant. For
example, only the conduct of criminal defense lawyers is subject
to the standards of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel." 9 Those who work for a fee need to be concerned about how money laundering statutes and cash reporting
requirements effect their own conduct as lawyers; other lawyers
need not.
Third, depending on the context, particular regulatory mechanisms may or may not be very significant. Malpractice is meaningless for government lawyers, and historically has been close
to meaningless for legal services lawyers, criminal defense lawyers, and in-house corporate lawyers."' Malpractice is significant for lawyers representing private clients on a retained basis
in litigation and transactional contexts.
Fourth, the ethical rules and laws that seem applicable to all
lawyers may have different meanings depending on the context.
For example, a jurisdiction may have a single general rule determining whether to disqualify an entire law office when one law-

108. See generally Green & Coleman, supra note 107 (discussing the unique aspects
of representing elder clients); Green & Dohrn, supra note 107 (discussing the unique
needs of children).
109. See Michael L. Guemple, Note, The Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard as
an Analogy for the Medical Malpractice Standard, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 77, 78
(1993) (stating that, with few exceptions, the Sixth Amendments protection of effective assistance of counsel does not apply to civil cases).
110. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the
Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 1, 6 (1995) (contrasting
the difficulty facing criminal defendants in suing their attorneys for malpractice as
opposed to civil plaintiffs or defendants).

384

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:357

yer in the office has a conflict of interest, but the rule may be
applied differently to government law offices and public defenders offices than to private law firms. The rule may also apply
differently to large urban law offices than to small rural ones. A
jurisdiction may have a single rule forbidding all lawyers from
engaging in dishonesty, deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation,"'
but the rule may be applied less restrictively to prosecutors and,
possibly, to lawyers for plaintiffs in civil rights cases.
So, too, issues that cut across areas of practice must be approached very differently depending on the context. Such crosscutting questions include: Which decisions are for the lawyer
and which are for the client? How should the lawyer counsel the
client with respect to those decisions that the client must make?
How should the lawyer go about making those decisions that are
entrusted to the lawyer? These questions pose very different
challenges for a government lawyer (whose duty is to "seek justice")," a child's lawyer,"' or a corporation's lawyer." 4
By limiting the contexts in which ethical issues are examined,
the contextual courses both emphasize and convey the importance of context in resolving ethical dilemmas and in defining
the lawyer's role and responsibilities. The one caveat is that the
contexts that are examined must be rich enough to allow consideration of the basic issues of legal ethics: competence, confidentiality, loyalty, etc. Although any lawyering context would be
worth exploring in an advanced course, not all standing alone
would be suitable for the basic course. The judicial context is an
obvious example. The advanced courses offered at Duke entitled
Ethical Issues in Judicial Decision-Making and at Fordham
entitled The Judicial Role and Responsibilities could not be
adapted to provide students a grounding in the basic issues of

111. See, e.g., VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4)
(Michie 1950); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 8.4(c) (1995).
112. See generally Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 37, at 69 & n.2
(discussing the difference in duties between the public attorney and the private
counselor).
113. See generally Green & Dohrn, supra note 107 (explaining the unique nature of
juvenile representation).
114. See generally Sporkin, supra note 100 (distinguishing the needs of corporate
clients from the representation of individual clients).
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professional responsibility and the applicable ethical standards.
The judicial role is simply too limited. Nor could this goal be
achieved exclusively through an examination of the prosecutorial
role.115 Yet, by exploring the role of prosecutor together with
that of the criminal defense lawyer, the course in Ethics in
Criminal Advocacy does allow consideration of the basic legal
ethics issues, while also allowing students to better understand
each role through a comparison with other roles. This is only
one of the many ways contexts can be limited while still satisfying the appropriate goals of a basic course in legal ethics.
B. Putting Ethics in the Foreground
There is another pedagogic benefit to teaching legal ethics in
a contextual, rather than survey, course. Teaching contextually
allows more time to impart the body of knowledge and develop
the skills that ought to be at the forefront of a basic course in
legal ethics. Teaching contextually does so by limiting the
amount of time that the class must spend talking about the
substantive law and other contextual material that form the
backdrop against which legal ethics problems must be
viewed." 6
In any legal ethics course, the professor must fill in the context if the student is to approach a problem as a lawyer."

115. George Fisher of Stanford has developed readings for a course on prosecutorial
ethics. See Deborah L. Rhode, Annotated Bibliography of Educational Materials on
Legal Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 361, 380.
116. The contextual ethics courses, like substantive law courses that include a
component on legal ethics, are premised on the understanding that ethical issues
should be examined in the context in which they arise, rather than in the abstract.
See, e.g., Scott J. Burnham, Teaching Legal Ethics in Contracts, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC.
105 (1991) (discussing the author's integration of ethics into the curriculum of a contracts course); Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Civil Practitioner: Teaching Legal Ethics in the Contracts Course, 21 J. LEGAL EDUc. 569 (1969)
(identifying how ethical problems can-be brought to the attention of students in a
first-year contracts course); Richard A. Matasar, Teaching Ethics in Civil Procedure
Courses, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 587 (1989) (explaining the inclusion of ethical teaching
into the doctrinal analysis of a civil procedure course). The difference, however, is

that the contextual ethics courses place the principal emphasis on the ethics problems, rather than on the substantive law.
117. See Bums, supra note 70, at 38-39 (stressing the importance of combining
rules with practice through active methods of dramatization and contextualization).
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Otherwise, the student cannot realistically address the problem
or appreciate how a lawyer would deal with it in real practice.
In a survey course, where the context is constantly changing,
there is an overwhelming amount of context to address. As Stephen Bundy discussed in his contribution to the conference at
Duke University, the students' limited familiarity with law and
law practice was one of the factors that motivated Boalt Hall to
move its professional responsibility course out of the first
year."' Second- and third-year students can gain more from
and contribute more to a legal ethics class than first-year students, both because of students' greater familiarity with the law
and because of their greater familiarity with practice, developed
through work in law offices and law school clinics."'
The problem is that even after one or two years of law school,
the students' knowledge of law and law practice is still limited.
Moreover, the knowledge they have acquired will differ from
student to student and may not be easily generalized. For example, a summer internship in a prosecutor's office will give limited insight into the dynamics of in-house corporate counsel's
office, while an upperclass course in antitrust law will give limited insight into family law. By limiting the amount of time that
must be spent explaining the legal, social, and personal "context," contextual courses afford more time for students to employ
the skill of identifying and resolving ethical problems in the
limited areas of practice in which, for that semester, they are
asked to imagine themselves working.

118. See Bundy, supra note 48, at 28-29 ("[The first-year studentsl lack of exposure
to relevant advanced courses, such as Criminal Procedure, Corporations, Tax, and
Environmental Law, made it more difficult to teach important and conceptually demanding topics, such as compliance counseling, opinion letters, client peijury, and
representation of corporations and other organizations.").
119. To quote Stephen Bundy again:
[T]here is clearly a sense in which Legal Profession is an advanced
course. Its full development is parasitic on students' basic familiarity
with critical concepts of legal obligation and procedural regularity and on
their emerging awareness, based on exposure to law office work in clinical, part-time, or summer employment, of the practical significance of
professional ethics and ethical decisionmaking.
Id. at 33.
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The concern might be raised that by eliminating some contextual information, one also eliminates part of the body of "legal
ethics" knowledge that ought to be transmitted. For example,
the challenge might be posed: If a student enrolled in Ethics in
Criminal Advocacy studies conflicts of interest in the joint representation of criminal defendants, then what will happen if she
becomes a trusts and estates lawyer? Will she be equipped to
deal with conflicts of interest in the joint representation of a
husband and wife? If she becomes a corporate lawyer, then will
she be equipped to deal with conflicts of interest in the joint
representation of a corporation and its employee? If she becomes
a legal services lawyer, then will she be equipped to deal with
the multiple representation of tenants?
To be sure, this new lawyer may not be fully prepared. But, in
all likelihood, she will be better prepared by the contextual
course than by the survey course. The choice is between examining the problem of joint representation in greater depth as it
arises in a single context or examining this problem more superficially as it arises across a wide range of contexts. In the contextual course, more time is available for developing the skill of
recognizing and resolving conflict of interest problems because
less time is spent exploring the various ways in which these
problems may arise in different contexts. 12 Later on, it will be
easier for the student to develop the knowledge relevant to a
new area of practice than it will be to develop the skill of analyzing an ethical dilemma in depth.
C. Lowering Student Resistance
Many have offered explanations for why students resist the
course in professional responsibility, 12' ranging from the idea
that legal ethics is too unlike traditional law courses

22

to the

120. See Dzienkowski et al., supra note 52, at 215-18 (noting the difficulty in presenting ethical issues without the context of a specific substantive area).
121. See supra notes 37 & 44.
122. Part of the explanation may be that students expect the legal ethics course to
be about ethics in the ordinary sense-that is, something along the lines of how to
get to heaven by doing right. See Bundy, supra note 48, at 30 (discussing Ronald M.
Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A CurricularParadox;
1979 Aw. B. FouND. REs. J. 247). At best, this leads students initially to perceive
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idea that it is too much like traditional courses. 1" One source
of student resistance-perhaps paradoxically because legal ethics is one of the few subjects that cuts across all areas of law
practice-is the perception that the legal ethics course is irrelevant to the student's career in the law."2 Rightly or wrongly, a
course focusing on the area of practice in which the student
expects to engage is more likely to be perceived as relevant."
that the course is unnecessary: As one of my students put it, "I don't need to take
this course; I went to Sunday School." It is not a complete answer to observe, as did
Professors Cramton and Koniak in an article prepared for the earlier conference at
William & Mary, that
the subject of legal ethics is not coextensive with the subject of personal
ethics. The restrictions on a lawyer engaging in a business transaction
with a client, the rules on safekeeping client property, and the nuances
of conflicts of interest are not matters that law students should be expected to intuit based on their otherwise fully developed moral character,
however good that moral character might be.
Cramton & Koniak, supra note 47, at 152-53. These authors noted later in the same
article that, "[a] legal ethics course should include discussion of how to be a good
person while being a good lawyer. One aspect of this dimension of lawyering is the
proper extent to which a lawyer can bring to bear her own moral values while effectively representing clients." Id. at 176. Thus, a course in legal ethics requires students to ask themselves not only, "How must I conduct myself as a lawyer?" but
also such disquieting questions as, "How should I conduct myself as a lawyer, and
what kind of lawyer-indeed, what kind of person-do I want to be?"
123. See Mixon & Schuwerk, supra note 6, at 93-100 (discussing Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91 (1968)).
124. See supra note 44.
125. For example, Robert Burns wrote:
[I]t is fair to say that most of the students who choose this course are at
least contemplating professional lives in which litigation will play a role.
For them, we believe, litigation-related simulations increase the level of
interest even in doctrinal areas that are not necessarily related to litigation.
Burns, supra note 70, at 44.
In Fordham's course material, we emphasize that students should not be dissuaded from enrolling in a contextual course for fear that they ultimately might not
practice in the area. Each offering explores the core issues in professional responsibility such as confidentiality, conflicts, the role of the lawyer in society, etc., and
what students learn in the context of one practice area is transferable to another.
This does not mean, however, that one class is likely to be no more relevant than
another. There would be an advantage to studying legal ethics in the context of the
area of practice in which one seeks to find a career. But the benefit would not be
that one acquires a better grounding in legal ethics. It would simply be that one acquires greater familiarity with the particular area of practice that comprises the
"context" within which the course is taught.
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Consequently, another benefit of contextual courses is that stu-

dents are generally more receptive to them. 6
Where more than one contextual course is offered, the very
fact of being afforded a choice is also likely to make students
more receptive.2 Even if the curriculum affords only one option, at least at the more homogenous law schools, a contextual
course may be preferable to a survey course. For example, one
can imagine Columbia offering a single course focusing on the
representation of corporations and other large organizations in
large law firms or as in-house corporate counsel, or Montana
offering a single course focusing on the representation of individuals and small businesses in small firm or solo practice. Teaching legal ethics in context, therefore, does not require a menu of
contextual course offerings, the development of which might
meet various administrative obstacles. 2 ' In law schools in

126. See, e.g., Daly et al., supra note 1, at 194 (discussing the student response to
the contextual courses at Fordham University).
127. See, e.g., Bundy, supra note 48, at 29 (noting the benefit of "a range of
approaches").
128. Allowing students to satisfy the law school's professional responsibility requirement by taking, as an alternative to the survey course, a legal ethics course chosen
from a menu of "contextual" offerings might require more sections of legal ethics
and, thus, the dedication of more faculty resources to the subject. This would also
require identifying professors who are familiar with, or at least interested in, each of
the various areas of practice. Because these professors (unless they would be teaching in the tax area) would not be able to rely on a commercially produced casebook
with the accompanying teacher's manual, this might require affording those professors time away from other responsibilities to develop original teaching, materials.
Several objections to such a curriculum reform can be anticipated. First, why
should faculty resources be dedicated in this manner? This Article is meant to provide some answers to this question, although its answers may or may not be convincing to those who have no stake or experience in teaching legal ethics. Further,
where will the law school find professors to teach the course, and where will the
law school find the resources to free these professors from other responsibilities, so
that they can develop the contextual courses? At law schools such as Fordham,
Duke, Michigan, and Texas, the faculties already included members who were interested in developing such courses, and Keck Foundation grants expanded the available resources. Elsewhere, legal ethics professors can build on work that has already
been done both by grant recipients and by others who have developed contextual
courses. For example, copies of course material developed at Fordham are available
from the faculty who offer the respective courses; Deborah Rhode has developed an
annotated bibliography of legal ethics materials, many of which would be useful in
developing contextual courses. See Rhode, supra note 115, at 361-89 (listing references to legal ethics educational materials). This, however, is an incomplete answer.
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which more than one section of legal ethics is offered, students
can be given a choice between the survey course and at least one
contextual offering with relatively little strain on resources, but
with likely gain in terms of student satisfaction.
One might ask, of course, whether winning over students is
an important goal. After all, the rewards of teaching legal ethics
should not necessarily be in the here and now. In this course,
more than any other, our professional responsibility is less to
satisfy the consumers of legal education than to protect the
public whom they will serve. Nevertheless, in legal ethics as in
other courses, we are likely to teach more effectively when our
students are more open to what we have to offer.
IV. RESPONSIBILITIES BEYOND THE BASIC COURSE

That law schools have a responsibility to go beyond offering the
basic legal ethics course goes without saying. It is one thing for a
single legal ethics class to set a limited goal; it is another thing for
a law school to do so.'29 Moreover, as Carrie Menkel-Meadow has
noted, legal ethics is already taught elsewhere in the law school
for better or worse-and, mostly, for worse." 0 For example, "the
traditional classroom fosters adversariness, argumentativeness,

One of the undeniable burdens, as well as pleasures, of teaching contextual courses
is the need to put one's personal stamp on the teaching materials.
At the end of the day, the only way for a law school to overcome the obstacles
to developing a contextual curriculum--or, really, any kind of reasonably respectable
curriculum in the area of legal ethics-is to employ a sufficient number of faculty
members who are interested in teaching legal ethics and who, as a matter of professional pride, will want to do so effectively. As Professor Bundy has noted, professional responsibility instruction has tended to evolve, in large part, "incrementally, in
accord with faculty energies and interests." Bundy, supra note 48, at 30. That is
certainly how it evolved at Fordham. See Daly et al., supra note 1, at 199-201. That
is how it will continue to develop-if it is to develop-at most law schools.
129. See, e.g., TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 22, at 13-25
(recommending that law schools increase training in legal ethics and suggesting how
to implement this recommendation); Johnstone & Treuthart, supra note 59, at 103
(arguing for "an integrated and comprehensive program that engages students in the
type of thoughtful reflection and interaction that will carry through to their working

lives").

130. See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 5-9 (1991) (explaining the realities of the ethical messages that are conveyed to law students today).

19981

TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS IN CONTEXT

and zealotry, along with the view that lawyers are only the means
through which clients accomplish their ends-what is 'right' is
whatever works for this particular client or this particular
case."131 The pervasiveness of this vision of legal practice is one
of the many challenges confronting those of us who teach legal
ethics courses. If law schools are to aspire to develop "ethical"
lawyers, rather than cynical lawyers, then they must132teach legal
ethics better both within and outside the curriculum.
Further, law schools should consider working with other institutions, such as courts, bar associations, disciplinary bodies,
and, where they exist, state ethics institutes, to complete the
task of training practitioners to recognize and resolve ethical
dilemmas. In many ways, teaching practitioners is far easier
than teaching law students. Practitioners are already "in context." Additionally, they are likely to recognize the importance of
legal ethics as an aspect of law practice. If they would find "survey" courses in legal ethics to be largely irrelevant to their experience, then many would appreciate programs that examined
ethical problems in the context in which they worked. 3 1 These
might include not only lectures or panel discussions, but also,
perhaps more effectively, directed dialogues with other lawyers
who practiced in the same or related contexts and who address
similar ethical problems. Those who teach contextual courses in
the law school are particularly well equipped to contribute to
such professional programs and should do so to the extent that
time allows. Perhaps we who teach legal ethics will be forgiven

131. Id. at 7.
132. See generally TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 22, at 1325 (suggesting more pervasive methods of teaching legal ethics).
133. For example, courses focusing exclusively on judicial ethics, while too narrow
for law students, would be ideal for judges. See, e.g., Cynthia Gray & Frances Kahn
Zemans, Instructing Judges: Ethical Experience and Educational Technique, LAW &

CONTEIMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 305, 305-06 (distinguishing the ethical

requirements of judges as opposed to practicing attorneys and noting the lack of ju-

dicial ethics training in the legal education system); V. Robert Payant, Ethical
Training in the Profession: The Special Challenge of the Judiciary, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 313, 318-322 (explaining the National Judicial
College's method of teaching judicial ethics); Stephen M. Simon & Maury S. Landsman, Judicial Ethics Simulation Based Training, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-

mer/Autumn 1995, at 323, 327-36 (discussing ethical issues that judges commonly
face).
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for accomplishing less at the earlier stages of the "educational
continuum" if we contribute a little more at the later stages.
V. CONCLUSION
We who teach legal ethics "in context" start with the premise
that legal ethics is a subject worthy of serious academic and
professional study combining a body of knowledge, a lawyering
skill, and a set of professional values. We accept that students
have much to learn and that they will not learn it all after a
single course. Our goal is to do our best with limited resources
to develop our students' appreciation of the demands of ethical
lawyering. Our experience is that we do this most effectively by
leading our students through a deep exploration of the core
issues of legal ethics in the context of only a few areas of law
practice, rather than by leading them on a tour of all the issues
of professional responsibility as they arise across the full spectrum. This is the difference between leading a one-hour discussion of the work of a single artist and leading a one-hour tour of
the entire collection of the Metropolitan Museum.
By teaching legal ethics contextually, we at Fordham, and
others elsewhere, preserve our passion for teaching legal ethics.
Simply put, we better enjoy teaching the course this way. To be
sure, not all will share our preference. For those who do, this
may be the best reason of all for teaching legal ethics in context.
Most of us who teach legal ethics are deeply committed to developing our craft, as this conference shows. But teaching is more
than a craft. It is an art. To succeed, we must preserve our passion for this art in whatever way we can.
In the end, that may be the most important lesson of our
experience-and of this conference. There are various pedagogically justifiable ways to teach the course. We will be most successful as teachers if we choose the method that we most enjoy.
So, if we have adopted the credo, "less is more," it is because
"less" is not only more effective, it is also more fun.

